xRUNES against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 0 USDCLimited by manipulation cost
- Depth within 5%
- buy2.86 USDC (shortened; full value 2.8651285133450146907910926474 USDC)sell2.92 USDC (shortened; full value 2.920098135237749858654551895205899053369576236048 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 0 USDCReachable at no cost: nothing stands in the way
- Checks
- 6 triggered3 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.00106822 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0010682295750163 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.00113910 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0011391062837893 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.00108884 USDC (shortened; full value 0.001088847327467 USDC)
Checks
MANIPULATION_CHEAPMANIPULATION_RATIO_LOWPRICE_SOURCE_CONFLICTSPREAD_EXTREMETHIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated3
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 0 USDC
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh