xRUNES against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 0 USDCLimited by manipulation cost
- Depth within 5%
- buy2.86 USDC (shortened; full value 2.8615368807250183970696922513 USDC)sell2.91 USDC (shortened; full value 2.916437594474129559989495799820656112067841222657 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 0 USDCReachable at no cost: nothing stands in the way
- Checks
- 6 triggered3 not evaluated
History
Collateral ceiling
The most this asset could back at each reading: the lower of the liquidation and manipulation limits.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 2.98 USDC (shortened; full value 2.98543522233451929727639284332892174709894346379 USDC)
- Highest
- 3.38 USDC (shortened; full value 3.389245770091162508837591709195685537763474375802 USDC)
- Max safe collateral
- 3.00 USDC (shortened; full value 3.000758919302042617139247482425370438662667342976 USDC)
Checks
THIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHMANIPULATION_CHEAPMANIPULATION_RATIO_LOWPRICE_SOURCE_CONFLICTSPREAD_EXTREMENot evaluated3
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 0 USDC
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh