USDGLO against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
High
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 25.57 USDC (shortened; full value 25.575452728177530008376998162454055573054688626224 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy49.12 USDC (shortened; full value 49.1271311676033747984626735123 USDC)sell25.23 USDC (shortened; full value 25.238758606194493886110088617109981375052481712072 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 5 triggered3 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Higher at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.99624975 USDC
- Highest
- 1.0005 USDC
- Mid price
- 1.0005 USDC
Checks
HOLDER_CONCENTRATION_EXTREMETHIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHPRICE_SOURCE_CONFLICTSPREAD_EXTREMENot evaluated3
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 24.36 USDC (shortened; full value 24.3634816 USDC)
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh