SWTHRT against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Medium
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 4.59 USDC (shortened; full value 4.595885031651687294611395881000715980915984454872 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy4.45 USDC (shortened; full value 4.4500047598933013574160261979 USDC)sell4.53 USDC (shortened; full value 4.535381411562800247812204586617967442692405597316 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 2 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.00000200 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0000020058900425 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.00000220 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0000022030120841 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.00000201 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0000020128056964 USDC)
Checks
THIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh