SBB against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Medium
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 4.68 USDC (shortened; full value 4.686075178275730537685144645944763034666094466022 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy4.53 USDC (shortened; full value 4.5373321362328765181839098829 USDC)sell4.62 USDC (shortened; full value 4.624384228580136372322462025413203645588139017641 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 2 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Higher at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.00000835 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0000083585890038 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.00000946 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0000094620812947 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.00000896 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0000089642961897 USDC)
Checks
THIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh