JDMC against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Medium
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 6.12 USDC (shortened; full value 6.126131947457962868261307498561090877604568116802 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy5.93 USDC (shortened; full value 5.9316793475412667767581788137 USDC)sell6.04 USDC (shortened; full value 6.045483028389988808536320521441847012317574811731 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 2 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.00022038 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0002203837196595 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.00024698 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0002469876451148 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.00022393 USDC (shortened; full value 0.0002239375161615 USDC)
Checks
THIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh