Indocoin against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
High
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 0.82 USDC (shortened; full value 0.8287872078114023067250850805768868944773012526 USDC)Limited by liquidation depth
- Depth within 5%
- buy0.80 USDC (shortened; full value 0.8024802609942513130874660626 USDC)sell0.81 USDC (shortened; full value 0.8178764417651225566619283629346570261663876053 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- Not reachableThe order book cannot reach the target
- Checks
- 3 triggered5 not evaluated
History
Collateral ceiling
The most this asset could back at each reading: the lower of the liquidation and manipulation limits.
Lower at the end of the window than at its start
- Lowest
- 0.82 USDC (shortened; full value 0.828734748083799432766531341666675915182716587474 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.85 USDC (shortened; full value 0.859421125477613332269604467679961707803029012148 USDC)
- Max safe collateral
- 0.82 USDC (shortened; full value 0.829047301334812215731182232584390717455713826714 USDC)
Checks
HOLDER_CONCENTRATION_EXTREMETHIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated5
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
NOT reachable through the order book: this is the cost of exhausting the book, not of reaching the target
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- not computed
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh