FRED against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 0.27 USDC (shortened; full value 0.2750000000000054737408 USDC)Limited by manipulation cost
- Depth within 5%
- buy20.50 USDC (shortened; full value 20.5037488151692870875630047032 USDC)sell20.89 USDC (shortened; full value 20.897128488892058990287399631701435967930637781408 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 1.10 USDC (shortened; full value 1.1000000000000218949632 USDC)Reachable through the order book
- Checks
- 5 triggered3 not evaluated
History
No readings were stored in this range from this source
The engine accepted the request and returned nothing for Hubble. The series is as old as the deployment, so a window can reach back further than anything that was recorded. It is not empty because the figures were zero.
Checks
Triggered5
- Cheap to move the price
- Cheap next to real trading
- Price sources disagree
- Extreme spread
- Thin depth at 5%
Not evaluated3
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 1.10 USDC (shortened; full value 1.1000000000000218949632 USDC)
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 1.10 USDC (shortened; full value 1.1000000000000218949632 USDC)
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh