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keel
Ledger
65,275,153
Methodology
1.0.8-draft
Age
7s

AMM against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?

All assets

AMM / USDC

GARQ…BDOQ

Risk band

Critical

partial confidence

A floor: the real band can only be worse.

Max safe collateral
0 USDCLimited by manipulation cost
Depth within 5%
buy13.77 USDC (shortened; full value 13.7724635392947426889842562291 USDC)sell59.53 USDC (shortened; full value 59.532745606750067352491717865587750161060151439912 USDC)
Cost to move +50%
0 USDCReachable at no cost: nothing stands in the way
Checks
7 triggered3 not evaluated

No readings were stored in this range from this source

The engine accepted the request and returned nothing for Hubble. The series is as old as the deployment, so a window can reach back further than anything that was recorded. It is not empty because the figures were zero.

Checks

What fires now, how long it has been firing across the window above, and what could not run.

Triggered7

  • Nothing tradable within 2%
  • Cheap to move the price
  • Cheap next to real trading
  • Extreme spread
  • One holder owns most of it
  • Thin depth at 5%
  • Supply is concentrated

Not evaluated3

  • No genuine trade in 30 days
  • No genuine trade in 7 days
  • Volume may be wash traded

Evidence

The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.

An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.

Cost of a 50% move, order book only
0 USDC

The target is reachable through the order book

Genuine volume in the oracle window
0 USDC

Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter

Cost against genuine volume
not computed

Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable

Total attack cost
0 USDC

The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh