AMM against USDC — what depth stands behind this price?
Risk band
Critical
partial confidence
A floor: the real band can only be worse.
- Max safe collateral
- 0 USDCLimited by manipulation cost
- Depth within 5%
- buy17.71 USDC (shortened; full value 17.718568522948808926413579615 USDC)sell55.61 USDC (shortened; full value 55.61058544267650923870120476240889423726805158161 USDC)
- Cost to move +50%
- 0 USDCReachable at no cost: nothing stands in the way
- Checks
- 7 triggered3 not evaluated
History
Price
The midpoint the engine read at each scan. It says what the market quotes, not what it can absorb.
Unchanged across the window
- Lowest
- 0.00141666 USDC (shortened; full value 0.00141666666666665 USDC)
- Highest
- 0.00141666 USDC (shortened; full value 0.00141666666666665 USDC)
- Mid price
- 0.00141666 USDC (shortened; full value 0.00141666666666665 USDC)
Checks
ZERO_DEPTH_2PCTMANIPULATION_CHEAPMANIPULATION_RATIO_LOWSPREAD_EXTREMEHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_EXTREMETHIN_DEPTH_5PCTHOLDER_CONCENTRATION_HIGHNot evaluated3
- No genuine trade in 30 days
- No genuine trade in 7 days
- Volume may be wash traded
Evidence
The figures behind the verdict, as the engine served them.
An averaging oracle makes an attacker outweigh genuine trading as well as move the book. A market with no genuine volume has no such defence.
- Cost of a 50% move, order book only
- 0 USDC
The target is reachable through the order book
- Genuine volume in the oracle window
- 0 USDC
Over the last 900 seconds (15 minutes), after the genuine-trade filter
- Cost against genuine volume
- not computed
Below 1, moving the price is cheaper than all genuine trading across the window. Not computed when there was no genuine volume or the target is unreachable
- Total attack cost
- 0 USDC
The move, plus the genuine volume an averaging oracle forces an attacker to outweigh